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One of the many wonderful features of Representing Justice' is its
exploration of the ambivalence of the traditional depiction of Justice.
Justice's blindfold suggests both impartiality and moral or factual
blindness; her sword cuts through obfuscations and complexities but also
inflicts pain and death. Other contributions to this Issue develop further
ambivalences: Bennett Capers considers whether Justice's blindness
makes her color-blind;2 Peter Goodrich asks whether her blindfold
obstructs her vision or rather makes it impossible for us to see her.' Yet
the ambivalence does not stop there.
Much that we would wish to incorporate in a portrait of Justice is
missing from the familiar image of the Goddess with the Scales. True,
leaving things out of a depiction can sharpen our perception of what
remains. Yet it is also true that focusing on what has been omitted can
help us move beyond what is familiar. As artists sometimes portray a
figure by drawing the negative space around it, looking for what is absent
from an image can clarify what is present.
I. THE PHASES OF JUSTICE
Justice, at least procedural justice, is a process, not a single event.
Typically, it involves an act or series of acts, a dispute arising from those
acts, a claim, a response, a decision, and that decision's effects.' Unless
we know something of these, we will find it hard to decide if justice has
indeed been rendered. The absence of some of these stages-the
interchange between claimant and respondent, and decision by a third
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. Thanks to David and Susan Cole for their
help. This Essay is for Andrew DeShong.
1. JuDiTH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND
RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
2. I. Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179 (2012); I. Bennett Capers, On
Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 203 (2006).
3. Peter Goodrich, The Foolosophy of Justice and the Enigma of Law, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
141 (2012).
4. See generally William H. Simon, Courthouse Iconography and Chayesian Judicial Practice,
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party-will usually lead us to describe the process as unjust even if it
somehow reaches the right result. Even legal systems that rely more than
ours on self-help and revenge turn out on closer examination to proceed
through a series of steps.' And, of course, it is precisely the replacement
of an injured person's swift revenge by a process that includes neutral
adjudication that is essential to our usual idea of justice.'
The traditional sculptural depiction of Justice leaves out, or at least
flattens, the process of justice. Justice's scales may symbolize the act of
deciding, and her sword the execution of judgment, but the presentation of
evidence and argument is, at best, only alluded to by the empty pans of
the scales. This depiction of Justice looks like a single overwhelming
intervention that holds in its hands both decision and enforcement.
Resnik and Curtis show us a more phased picture of justice: The Justice
of Cambyses (1498) by Gerard David.' In four scenes presented on two
panels, this diptych shows us the judge Sisamnes's acceptance of a bribe,
his arrest while sitting on the judicial throne, his gruesome flaying, and
the installation of his son and successor on a throne now covered by his
father's skin. That certainly covers the crime, its punishment, and the
punishment's deterrent impact, but even here there is no representation of
the trial. King Cambyses simply steps in and orders the execution-an
abruptness consistent with his usual portrayal as a murderous tyrant.8
Homer's Shield of Achilles presents a still more complete picture-or
rather, a verbal description of a picture-of the phases of justice:
There, in the Forum swarm a num'rous train;
The subject of debate, a townsman slain:
One pleads the fine discharg'd, which one deny'd,
And bade the publick and the law decide:
The witness is produc'd on either hand;
For this, or that, the partial people stand:
Th'appointed heralds still the noisy bands,
And form a ring, with scepters in their hands;
On seats of stone, within the sacred place,
The rev'rend elders nodded o'er the case;
Alternate, each th'attesting scepter took,
And rising solemn, each his sentence spoke.
Two golden talents lay amidst, in sight,
5. CLINTON BAILEY, BEDOUIN LAW FROM SINAI AND THE NEGEV: JUSTICE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT (2009); NJAL'S SAGA (Robert Cook trans., 2001).
6. See, e.g., AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES.
7. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 38-41, plates 10, I1.
8. For a later presentation, see THOMAS PRESTON, A LAMENTABLE TRAGEDY MIXED FULL OF
PLEASANT MIRTH CONTAINING THE LIFE OF CAMBISES, KING OF PERCIA (1569).
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The prize of him who best adjudg'd the right.'
Here we have the subject of the dispute, pleadings, public trial with
witnesses, and judgment. Little of this complex process is depicted or
implied by the statues of Justice adorning so many courthouses.
II. THE PEOPLE OF JUSTICE
Homer's description differs from the Goddess with the Scales in
another way: it is thronged with people, all of them participating in the
litigation. Justice is an encounter among human participants, those whose
own concerns are at stake, and those who join in discussing, promoting, or
resisting an appropriate decision, which will in turn have its effects on
still other people. By contrast, statues of Justice may contain no humans
at all if one conceives of the being they present as a Goddess, a
personification, or an ideal. That conception would be especially plausible
in Continental law courts, where judges sit in groups and opinions are
almost always anonymous.
Even if one regards the statue as symbolizing an individual, common-
law judge, that representation leaves the judge scarcely human: grandiose
but stony like the Commendatore's statue in Mozart's Don Giovanni, and
dependent on a mechanical decision mechanism. And what has become of
the jurors? Indeed, what has become of appellate courts that sit in panels?
Where are the lawyers?'o What about the spectators, whose importance
was recognized in Homer and in Athens" and continues to this day?l2
What about the clerks and marshalls? After all, even in Homer's time the
heralds who kept order were thought to merit mention.
The most important absentees are the litigants themselves. As Lon
Fuller said,
[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact
that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation
in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments
for a decision in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance of
this participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression.
Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the
integrity of adjudication itself.'
9. THE ILIAD OF HOMER: TRANSLATED BY ALEXANDER POPE, at XVIII.577-90 (Steven
Shankman ed., 1996) [hereinafter ILIAD]; see RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 25.
10. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 372-75 (describing a courthouse tribute to a pro bono
lawyer).
11. See generally Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 119 (2012).
12. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 944 N.E.2d 135
(Mass. 2011); RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 293-305.
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Statues of Justice do not include the litigants, even in the form of the tiny
figures that formerly occupied the scales.14
One has to wonder why construction committees elect to place before
our courthouses the figure of a single person, bearing the judicial scales
and sword. What are the rest of us supposed to think, as we enter and
leave the courthouse, of the judicial process so portrayed? Very likely
courthouse planners, who nowadays aspire to communicate openness and
diversity,15 thought of Justice not as the whole shebang, but as a sort of
guardian angel presiding over and inspiring the human participants in
adjudication. Perhaps the planners were unaware of the possibilities that
their adherence to the traditional sole figure excluded, or shied away from
the controversy that alternatives might provoke.16 But there are indeed
alternatives.
Consider, for example, Ben Shahn's Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti, a
work with many incarnations, the most elaborate of which is a mural at
the University of Syracuse." (Needless to say, none can be found in a
courthouse.) Here, Judge Lowell is barely visible, looking out through a
window in his courthouse as if from the prison of the law. The defendants,
Sacco and Vanzetti, loom large front and center. In some versions, they
are in their caskets. Demonstrating members of the public stand to the
left, and on the right are Harvard's President Lowell and the other
members of the commission that upheld the conviction. So justice-or
rather injustice-is presented as a public and political struggle that
Figure 1. The Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti, Ben Shahn, 1931-1932.
Art 0 Estate of Ben Shahn/Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY.
14. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 20, 23.
15. Id. at 166-68, 183-91.
16. Id. at 108-26.
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involves many people, some of them neither parties, witnesses, jurors or
judges.
III. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE
To the visual sense-indeed, not just to the visual sense-justice and
injustice are often hard to distinguish. In a trial overshadowed by the
threat of lynching, "although every form may have been preserved," one
may still inquire, as Justice Holmes did in the Leo Frank case, "whether
they have been more than an empty shell."" Shakespeare provides two
obvious examples of such sham trials: in The Merchant of Venice Portia
disguises herself as a jurist in order to bring about Shylock's
condemnation, while in Measure for Measure the Duke makes Angelo the
judge at his own trial to unmask his villainy more dramatically.19 On the
other hand, justice may have been done even when the appearance of
justice is lacking.20 Of course, politically engaged artists such as Ben
Shahn and Orozco2 1 are only some of those who have found ways to
depict injustice, but this usually involves departing from what is likely to
be seen in a just or unjust court and from the traditional iconography of
justice. That iconography provides little to tell us whether what we are
seeing satisfies the requirements of justice.
Dieric Bouts's The Justice ofEmperor Otto III (1468-82),22 a diptych of
the same genre, period and function as The Justice of Cambyses,2 3 shows
the difficulty of distinguishing justice from injustice by its appearance. In
the left panel, a count is beheaded on charges of making advances to
Otto's wife, who can be seen in the background making those charges to
Otto. In the right panel, the count's wife proves his innocence, undergoing
the ordeal by carrying a bar of hot metal, and Otto orders his own wife
burned at the stake for her false accusation. Two cruel deaths inflicted by
the law, but which one is just and which one unjust? Today, we might be
skeptical of a sentence based on the private accusation of the judge's
18. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Frank was indeed later
lynched, a victim of anti-semitic prejudice. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (rev.
ed. 2008).
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act 5, sc. 1; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.
20. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988); R. v. Bow St.
Metropo. Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] I AC 119 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.). In these cases, courts set aside
decisions by judges who should have disqualified themselves because of an appearance of partiality,
while professing belief that the judges had in fact been impartial.
21. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 349-66.
22. Figure 2; see CATHELINE PlRIER-D'IETEREN, DIERIC BOUTS: THE COMPLETE WORKS 45-57,
61-62, 70-71, 298 (2007).
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Figure 2. The Justice ofEmperor Otto III, Dieric Bouts, 1468-1482.
C Royal Museums of Fine Arts of Belgium, Brussels. [Grafisch Buro Lefevre, Heule.]
wife; but we might also doubt the veracity of the ordeal. And not just
today: some people in the Middle Ages believed that one could trick the
ordeal.24 So if we the viewers can tell that the count's execution was
unjust, and his accuser's just (if burning at the stake can be just), it is less
because of anything we see in Dieric Bouts's picture than because we
have heard the story on which it is based.2 5
In the traditional depiction of Justice, even the scales provide no
guaranty of justice. They are presumably meant to symbolize impartiality
because they remain in equilibrium until the trial begins, but they can also
suggest a mechanical and therefore inhuman decision procedure. Is it the
whole person who is to be weighed, as in depictions of judgment after
death,26 or just the merits of the case? Is the prevailing party the one
whose claims are more weighty, as we moderns are likely to assume, or is
weight rather the sign of defeat, as in the Iliad:
Low sinks the scale surcharg'd with Hector's fate;
Heavy with death it sinks, and hell receives the weight.27
24. JOSEPH BtDIER, THE ROMANCE OF TRISTAN AND ISEULT 119-29 (Hilaire Belloc trans., 1994).
25. JACOBUS DE VORAGINE, THE GOLDEN LEGEND 380 (William Granger Ryan trans., 1993).
26. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 20-24.
27. ILIAD, supra note 9, at XXII.271-76. The same interpretation of the scales appears in VIRGIL,
AENEAD, at XII.1054-57 (Penguin Classics 1997) (John Dryden trans., 1697); and JOHN MILTON,
[Vol. 24:247252
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And perhaps the scales of Justice appraise neither the litigants nor their
claims: "the balance she holdeth are not to weigh the right of the cause,
but the weight of the bribe."2 8 Looking at the apparatus does not disclose
how it is being used.
In the same way as Justice's scales and her blindfold symbolize not just
impartiality but also blindness and inaccessibility,2 9 the meaning of her
drapery and of the robes of real judges is ambivalent. The robe suggests
that the judge has discarded all merely personal concerns in the quest for
impartiality.30 But in doing so, the judge may have divested himself or
herself of humanity, like the newly elected Pope in Brecht's Galileo, who
becomes more distant and institutional as he dons his vestments,31 or like
the antislavery judges described by Robert Cover, who felt obliged by
their role to hand down proslavery decisions.3 2 Alternatively, it may turn
out that the robe covers the criminal who committed the crime for which
another is being tried.33 Perhaps judges should imitate Chief Justice Doe
of New Hampshire, who wore no robe and presided in country clothes-
though that too would be no assurance of unadorned justice.3 4
The intriguing experiment of Oscar Chase and Jonathan Thong35
similarly suggests that the appearance of justice is untrustworthy. They
find that law students rate their moot court judges more highly when the
judges wear judicial robes and preside in a real courtroom. 36 Perhaps, as
the authors observe, the students are not mistaken because robes and
courtroom inspire the judges to fill more perfectly the judicial role.
Becoming a judge exposes one to the powerful influence of tradition and
expectation that help constitute that role, and possibly the trappings and
PARADISE LOST, at IV.990-1015.
28. JOHN LYLY, MIDAS (1592) (spelling modernized). For Renaissance depictions of scales in a
commercial context. See, for example, Petrus Christus's 1449 painting A Goldsmith in His Shop (at
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, in New York) and Quentin Matsys'sl 514 painting The Moneylender
and his Wife (at the Louvre, in Paris).
29. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 62-72; Capers, supra note 2; Goodrich, supra note 3.
30. Similarly, for lawyers to wear robes in court may promote equality among them and prevent
their dress style or cost from influencing the trier. JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL DIGNITY:
LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE 34 (2001); Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag. An Essay on Wigs, Robes
and Legal Change, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 1129, 1141 (1995); see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 684-86, 688-89
(1995).
31. BERTOLT BRECHT, LIFE OF GALILEO, at sc. 12 (John Willett trans., 2008).
32. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984).
33. HEINRICH VON KLEIST, THE BROKEN JUG (John T. Krumpelmann trans., 1962) (1808);
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE; Italo Calvino, A Judgment, in ADAM, ONE
AFTERNOON AND OTHER STORIES 133 (Archibald Colquhoun & Peggy Wright trans., 1983).
34. JOHN PHILIP REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967).
35. Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong, Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony on
Participant Evaluation ofProcess Fairness-Related Factors, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221 (2012).
36. Id. at 236.
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the suits of judgeship exert some of that power. Indeed, they may also
inspire the litigants, counsel, and jury to rise to the occasion. But perhaps
only the appearance and not the reality of justice is present, and the
students are experiencing placebo justice rather than the real thing.
And even if an observer could see that the scales are truly balanced and
the judges are both humane and impartial, procedural fairness cannot
guaranty the justice of a trial unless the substantive law to be applied is
just. Grant Gilmore famously claimed that "in Hell there will be nothing
but law, and due process will be meticulously observed." 81n the apartheid
era, the South African courts made impressive efforts to pursue
procedural justice, but the result was often the enforcement of unjust
laws. 9 Would an observer of a trial have seen justice or injustice? To
distinguish between the two, it would have been necessary to look outside
the courthouse.
IV. THE PLACES OF JUSTICE
Where is Justice to be found? According to an old tradition of which
Peter Goodrich reminds us, she has fled to the heavens. 40 Yet we continue
to represent her here on earth, nowadays almost exclusively in
courthouses. 4 1 That may reflect increased belief in law as the most
promising source of social justice. But focusing on courts as the potential
seat of justice may blindfold us by distracting our gaze from other sites
where she may be pursued.
The political realm of voters, legislators, and executives includes many
such sites. Any list of important acts of justice in our country should
include the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965,42 and any list of unjust
acts should include the presidential internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II.4 The courts did not perform these acts, but merely
declined to strike them down." Philosophical works on justice likewise
contemplate implementation in the constitutional and legislative realm
38. GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
39. STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW & LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF
EMERGENCY (1992).
40. Goodrich, supra note 3; see, e.g., EDMUND SPENSER, THE FAERIE QUEENE, at V.i.5, I1.
41. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 2-5, 87-88, 100-01, 187, plates 17-19, 28.
42. Pub. L. No. 88-552, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (officially
entitled the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
43. GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE
AMERICANS (2001).
44. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Indeed, the Court has now
intimated that it might hold the 1965 Act unconstitutional sometime in the future. See Northwest
Austin Munic. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 140 (2009).
[Vol. 24:247254
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rather than mainly through the courts.4 5 So when Amartya Sen places a
representation of Justice on the slip covers of his book The Idea of
Justice, he chooses Fra Angelico's drawing in which the Goddess is
crowned and bears a globe and sword, but no balance. This Justice is not
adjudicating a dispute between litigants, but ruling and reforming the
earth.
In past centuries, people recognized such views by placing
representations of Justice in city halls as well as courthouses.46 True,
adjudication often occurred in the municipal halls of cities like
Amsterdam, Bruges, Geneva, and New York, but so did legislative and
executive activities.47 Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Allegories of Good and Bad
Government in Siena's Palazzo Pubblico plainly include the latter, as do
other representations of Justice placed far from any court.4 8 Tellingly,
modem explorations of Lorenzetti's theme are found in courthouses, not
city halls or statehouses. 4 9 A representation of Justice can indeed be found
amidst the multifarious artwork of the United States Capitol, but it dates
from 1863.so Since then, Justice may not have left the earth, but she does
seem to have abandoned our legislatures.
Finally, what about Justice in the lives of citizens, far from the
mansions of government? The phases, people and appearances of
adjudicatory and even legislative justice do not exhaust its meaning in our
thoughts and endeavors. Micah's call to "do justice, and to love kindness,
and to walk humbly with your God""' was not directed primarily at
magistrates. And it was not only of courts that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel
was thinking when he said in the second century: "The world is sustained
by three things: justice, truth, and peace."S2 Justice is not wholly just
when it is just in courtrooms.
45. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
46. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 5, 33-39, 44-61.
47. Id. at 49-50, 134.
48. See id. at 25-30, 79-84, plates 6, 8; see also IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES 218-21 (2009).
49. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 30-33, plates 7, 9.
50. Justice and History: Overview, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, http://www.aoc.gov/cc/
art/justice and history.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). Statues of Justice in the New York City Hall
and Brooklyn Borough Hall likewise date from the nineteenth century. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note
1, at 5, 139.
51. Micah 6:8.
52. Pirke Avot 1:18. The following prooftext, "Speak the truth to one another, render true and
perfect justice in your gates," Zechariah 8:16, suggests that Rabbi Shimon did have in mind courts,
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